The Challenges of Mounting a Court Case on Behalf of an Animal

Maral Cavner

Attorney, Maral Cavner is a member of the Portland, Oregon (OR) community who recently graduated from Lewis and Clark Law School. An active volunteer, Maral Cavner serves as a founding board member of the Route 66 No-Kill Animal Rescue and Shelter and specialized in animal law through her law program at Lewis and Clark Law School, which houses the number one animal law program in the country.

One issue recently addressed in the Legal Intelligencer centers on whether animals are capable of suing for injuries that have been inflicted on them by humans. The answer, unfortunately under nearly all circumstances, is no, leaving animals with little recourse for the harms they endure.

Because animals are considered “property” under the law, they are not able to bring cases to court that enforce the few protections that are afforded them, such as those in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rather, a human must be found who is able to meet prudential and statutory standing requirements and plead the case on the animal’s behalf.

The thresholds are high for this, as the plaintiff must be closely enough associated with the situation such that a “concrete and particularized harm” was inflicted on them by the animal’s mistreatment.

One example is the Ringling Brothers elephants that were subject to inhumane treatment such as the use of bullhooks, which may contravene ESA provisions. In order to mount a case, a plaintiff with standing needed to be found who had a longstanding relationship with the animals, such as a circus trainer. Unfortunately, such a person is often unwilling or unable to speak out against the practices of the company on which they rely for a salary.

In the Ringling Brothers case, a former employee was ultimately found, but this did not prevent the case from being thrown out of court on the standing issue, without claimed ESA violations ever being taken up. The bottom line is that it is still extremely difficult to bring a case to court on behalf of an animal, particularly when weighed against the “property” interests involved, leaving the legal system lacking an obvious solution for the protection of animal victims.